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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, SIXTH AMENDMENT: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury 
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel 
for his defense. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 12: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, 
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to 
appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused 
person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, 
nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice 
put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jursidiction to hear the 
appeal in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-2 (a)-3(2) (f). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the appellant was denied the right 
to counsel of his own choice as guaranteed by Article I 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the Sixth 
amendment to the United States Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the First Judicial 
District Court in and for Cache County, State of Utah 
wherein appellant was convicted after a jury trial of 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony. 
II. DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant Shayne Edward Rhodes was charged 
with a single count of aggravated assault in violation of 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-203 (as amended 1983). 
After a jury trial, wherein witnesses were called by the 
State of Utah and the defendant having testified in his 
own behalf, he was found guilty as charged. The defendant 
was sentenced and committed to the Utah State Prison. 
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III. RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction 
entered against him and a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 21, 1988 the morning of the first 
day of trial, the appellant informed the court that he 
wanted to dismiss his attorney, Arden W. Lauritzen, because 
he did not feel that Mr. Lauritzen had done anything for him, 
nor did he feel that Mr. Lauritzen would do anything for him. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 3 (hereinafter "Tr".) The trial court 
informed the appellant "this seems to be pretty inappropriate 
time on the day of trial with a jury out here to decide you 
now need another lawyer." Tr. 1. 
The appellant stated that he had spoken with 
another attorney, D. Gilbert Athay, and that Mr. Athay had 
contacted the court. Tr.2. The court denied being contacted 
by Mr. Athay and told the appellant that his motion was "just 
a method of delay". Id. 
The court then stated "you've given me no 
reason why [Mr. Lauritzen1s] incompetent or what he hasn't 
done." Id. The appellant replied, "Well, there's nothing 
on my record that he has done to help me out." IcL The 
appellant went on to show that his co-defendant's attorney 
had tried to have the charges reduced. Tr.3. The court 
concluded by saying "your purposes and your actions speak 
a lot louder than words. This is simply a purpose of 
delay. I will deny your motion to continue and I won't 
release your attorney." Id. Appellant was subsequently 
tried before a jury and convicted. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issue in this case is whether the 
appellant was denied the right to counsel of his choice 
as guaranteed by Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Appellant contends that the trial court 
failed to reasonably and non-suggestively question the 
appellant about his dissatisfaction with his attorney, 
Arden Lauritzen, and failed to grant a continuance to allow 
the appellant to retain counsel of his choice. 
ARGUMENT 
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
OF HIS OWN CHOICE BY FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE SOME 
REASONABLE, NON-SUGGESTIVE EFFORT TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF 
APPELLANT'S COMPLAINTS. 
"It is axiomatic that in all criminal 
prosecutions the accused enjoys the right to have assistance 
of counsel for his defense, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963) and implicit in this guarantee is the right to 
be represented by counsel of one's choice." Linton v. 
Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 208 (6th Cir. 1981)(citing Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Defendant must be given a 
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reasonable opportunity to employ and consult with counsel; 
otherwise the right to be heard by counsel would be of 
little worth." Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 19. (1954). 
"If all attorneys were the same, the choice of an attorney 
would be of no moment. However, " [a]ttorneys are not 
fungible." U.S. v. Nichols, 841 U.S. F2d 1485, 1502 
(10th Cir. 1988)(citation omitted). 
In State v. Pursifell, 746 P. 2d 270 (Utah Ct 
App. 1987), the Utah Court of Appeals faced the issue 
presented in this appeal. The defendant in Pursifell 
informed the trial court on the first day of trial that he 
did not want to proceed with his court-appointed attorney. 
The trial court asked the defendant to specify his reasons 
for thinking that counsel had not represented his interests. 
The defendant conveyed his general complaint, but he also 
specifically complained that he had not received timely 
notification of a hearing scheduled on a motion to discover 
filed by his attorney. The Pursifell court noted that 
"a lengthy exchange ensued concerning the details of the 
discovery matter..." _Id. at 272. 
"Typically motions for substitute counsel are 
less likely to be granted when they would result in a 
significant delay or mistrial or would otherwise impede the 
prompt administration of justice." id. at 273. The Pursifell 
court noted: 
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"We fully appreciate the possibility that 
defendants will fabricate complaints about 
counsel in an effort to promote delay or 
otherwise manipulate the system. Weighed 
against that realization, however, must be 
recognition of the inability of many 
indigent defendants, in view of their level 
of education and sophistication, to adequately 
articulate their legitimate complaints 
involving appointed counsel. Therefore, when 
a complaint is registered by a criminal 
defendant concerning his or her appointed 
counsel, the court must balance the potential 
for last minute delay and the propensity for 
manipulation of the system against the 
competing concern about the likely inability 
of indigent defendants to articulate and 
communicate their dissatisfaction in a setting 
which most lay persons find quite 
intimidating." Id. [emphasis added] 
The Pursifell court went on to impose an 
affirmative duty on the trial court to make a record on its 
own when dissatisfaction with counsel is expressed and a 
request to change counsel is made by the defendant. 
"However, when dissatisfaction is expressed 
the court must make some reasonable, non-
suggestive efforts to determine the nature 
of the defendant's complaints and to apprise 
itself of the facts necessary to determine 
whether the defendant's relationship with 
his or her appointed attorney has 
deteriorated to the point that sound 
discretion requires substitution or even 
such an extent that his or her Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel would be violated but 
for substitution." Jd. (Emphasis added). 
In the present case, the court failed to 
determine the nature of the appellant's complaints. 
Obviously, the appellant expressed dissatisfaction with 
Mr. Lauritzen. Tr. 1-3. The court responded to the 
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appellant's complaint by stating that "Mr. Lauritzen has a 
good reputation. He is an excellent criminal attorney." 
Tr. 2. In Pursifell, the court referred to the attorney's 
reputation but "[a] good overall reputation by counsel is no 
substitute for careful inquiry by the court since there is no 
guarantee even an excellent attorney especially a very 
busy one has not botched a particular case," Pursifell, 746 
P.2d at 273 n.l. (emphasis added). During the exchange 
the court did not ask the appellant to specify why he felt 
that Mr. Lauritzen had not done anything for him. The court 
merely stated: "You've given me no reason to show why 
[Mr. Lauritzen's] incompetent or what he hasn't done." Id. 
The record reflects that appellant decided two days after 
he got out of jail that he needed a new lawyer, one of the 
reasons he decided he needed a new lawyer was that he had 
been in jail six months. T. 1. Had the court made an 
appropriate, careful inquiry of defendant it would have 
learned that not only had the appellant been in jail but 
that: First, the appellant's parents, not the appellant, 
retained Mr. Lauritzen. Second, the appellant had been 
in jail for six months and during that time Mr. Lauritzen 
did not contact the appellant. Third, the first time any 
contact was had with Mr. Lauritzen and the appellant was on 
Wednesday, November 16, 1988 only five days before trial 
and this occurred at the instance of Mr. Rhodes. Fourth, 
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Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Lauritzen had not consulted in 
preparation for trial in over six months. Fifth, the 
appellant with his parents contacted D. Gilbert Athay on 
Friday, November 18, 1988 and at that time, Mr. Athay, in 
the presence of appellant and appellant's parents spoke 
with Judge Christoffersen by telephone requesting a 
continuance to prepare for the trial. Appellant was informed 
by Mr. Athay, subsequent to such telephone call that Judge 
Christoffersen told Mr. Athay that he could come up and try 
the case on Monday, November 21, 1988, but that there would 
be no continuance granted. (Affidavit of D. Gilbert Athay, 
Ex.A). Finally, appellant was instructed by Mr.Athay to 
appear at the trial on Monday and advise the court of all of 
the above facts and to request that the court permit him 
additional time to employ Mr. Athay and enable him to 
prepare for trial. 
The record in this case reflects that not only 
did the court fail to Make an appropriate inquiry pursuant to 
Pursifell but that the court's action prevented the appellant 
from making an appropriate record on his own. When the 
appellant tried to establish that his lawyer had done nothing 
in preparation for trial the court interjected: 
"The court; Nothing he's done to help you 
out? Here's the trial. When you get to 
trial is when you need his help." Tr.2 
Lines 20-24. 
Appellant concedes that the help of a lawyer is needed 
at trial as stated by the judge, but appellant submits he is 
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entitled to a lawyer who has prepared and consulted with 
appellant prior to such trial. 
Later in the discussion between appellant and 
the court, the appellant was trying to make a record and the 
court cut him off, thereby preventing him from making a 
full record: 
" Mr. Rhodes: I just don't feel he's 
done anything for me and I "don't feel he will. I feel 
I'm going in here— 
The Court: Your purposes and your actions 
speak a lot louder tnan words. This is simply for the 
purpose of delay. I will deny your motion to continue and 
I won't release your attorney. Anything else." Tr.3f Lines 
9-15. 
It is clear from this portion of the 
transcript the court was not interested in appellant's 
reasons for wanting to change counsel and it is further 
clear that the court prevented appellant from making an 
accurate and complete record of his reasons for wanting 
new counsel* 
Clearly the appellant was deprived of the 
right to counsel of his choice and even if the court in the 
present case felt that the appellant was trying to delay, 
the Pursifell court addressed that by saying: 
"Even when the trial judge suspects 
that the defendant's requests are 
disingenuous and designed solely to 
manipulate the judicial process and to delay 
the trial, perfunctory questioning is not 
sufficient." 
State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(citing United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 187 (3rd Cir. 
1982) . 
The trial court did not meet the standard 
set forth in Pursifell. In Pursifell the court upheld 
the trial court's determination because the court asked 
"follow-up questions". Here the court didn't ask any 
questions, it only made comments and such comments were at 
best argumentative with appellant and prevented him from 
making a record of his reasons for wanting to retain new 
counsel in his case. The court had decided the issue 
without fully apprising the situation. The appellant 
was dissatisfied with Mr. Lauritzen and as the facts 
demonstrate, the relationship had deteriorated, if a 
relationship ever existed. The court should have granted 
a continuance, but because no continuance was granted to 
allow the appellant to obtain counsel of his choice, his 
rights were violated. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that under 
the standard enunciated by the Utah Court of Appeals in 
Pursifell the appellant was denied the right to counsel 
of his choice. Therefore, appellant respectfully requests 
the case be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this ay of December, 1989. 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
Lawyer for Appellant 
ADDENEUM 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, SIXTH AMENDMENT: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel 
for his defense. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 12: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be 
confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to 
have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled 
to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband 
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense. 
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EXHIBIT A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) Case No. 890148 CA 
vs. ) 
SHAYNE EDWARD RHODES, ) AFFIDAVIT OF 
) D. GILBERT ATHAY 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
D. GILBERT ATHAY being first duly sworn, 
upon his oath deposes and says: 
1. Affiant is the attorney for the 
appellant in the above captioned action. 
2. Affiant was first contacted by the 
appellant and the appellant's parents on Friday, November 
18, 1988 and at that time appellant requested affiant's 
assistance and legal representation in a criminal case 
set for trial on Monday, November 21, 1988 in Cache County, 
State of Utah. 
3. Appellant advised affiant that his 
(appellant's) parents had retained a Mr. Arden Lauritzen 
to represent him in the pending action but appellant felt 
that Mr. Lauritzen had not done anything for the appellant 
including prepare for the upcoming trial. 
4. Appellant further advised affiant that 
he (appellant) had not been contacted by his attorney for 
over six months and that he (appellant) had finally met 
his attorney on Wednesday, November 16, 1988 and after 
that meeting appellant was convinced that Mr. Lauritzen 
was not prepared to go to trial. 
5. Appellant and his parents then contacted 
your affiant and met in affiant's office on Friday, 
November 18, 1989 and at that time a call was placed to 
Judge Christoffersen in Cache County and a continuance 
requested by affiant in order for affiant to have adequate 
time to prepare for trial. 
6. Affiant was advised by the judge that he 
(affiant) could come up and try the case on Monday, November 
21, 1988, but that no continuance would be granted. 
7. Affiant then advised appellant and his 
parents to appear in court on Monday, November 21, 198 8 in 
order to make a record of all the foregoing. 
^ A j j u i c Q a 
SUBSCRIBED AJU? SWORN to before me this 
day of December, 1989. 
IRY |>UBLIC y— ^ 
Residing at Salt~Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing to the 
Office of the Attorney General for the State of Utah, 
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah this u? day 
December, 1989. » > - / / • ^ / i 
